Course 2

COURSE 2 · MECHANISMS, BEHAVIOUR & ETHICS

Contents

Every tutorial in the course, topic by topic. Within a topic the tutorials are listed alphabetically.

← Back to Course 2 — Mechanisms, Behaviour & Ethics

Topic 1 · Mechanism Design

VCG, auctions, matching, voting — designing the rules of the game. Topic page →

Title Description
Combinatorial Auctions — Bidding on Bundles of Items Implement the winner determination problem for combinatorial auctions using integer programming with lpSolve, model a spectrum auction with complementarities, compare VCG and first-price payment rules, and demonstrate the exposure problem in R.
Deferred acceptance — stable matching via the Gale-Shapley algorithm Implement the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm for stable matching in R, prove proposer-optimality and strategy-proofness, simulate matching quality across problem sizes, and visualize the lattice of stable matchings.
Introduction to mechanism design — engineering incentives in strategic environments Survey the foundations of mechanism design as ‘reverse game theory,’ covering the revelation principle, Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility, and implementation theory, with a worked R implementation of the pivotal mechanism for public goods provision.
Practical Matching Market Design: From NRMP to School Choice Implement the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching, simulate the National Resident Matching Program, and compare with Top Trading Cycles for school choice.
The VCG mechanism — optimal multi-item allocation with truthful bidding Implement the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism for combinatorial allocation in R, prove dominant-strategy incentive compatibility and allocative efficiency, compute Clarke pivot payments, and compare to sequential auctions.
The Vickrey (second-price) auction — truth-telling as a dominant strategy Analyse the Vickrey sealed-bid second-price auction in R, prove that truthful bidding is a weakly dominant strategy, simulate revenue comparisons with first-price auctions, and visualize bidding equilibria.
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Topic 2 · Auction Theory

Revenue equivalence, Myerson optimal, combinatorial, GSP, empirical methods. Topic page →

Title Description
All-pay auctions and the economics of lobbying Analyse the all-pay auction in R where all bidders pay their bids regardless of winning, derive the symmetric equilibrium with uniform values, and apply the model to lobbying, rent-seeking, and political campaigns.
Common-value auctions and the winner’s curse Derive, simulate, and visualize the winner’s curse in common-value auctions: why naive bidding leads to systematic overpayment, and how rational bidders correct for the informational content of winning.
First-price sealed-bid auction — equilibrium bidding strategies Derive the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the first-price sealed-bid auction in R, show bid-shading as a function of the number of bidders, and compare revenue across auction formats.
GSP auction for online advertising Analyze the Generalized Second-Price auction used by search engines: compute VCG payments vs GSP equilibrium payments, show that GSP is not truthful, and characterize locally envy-free equilibria.
Revenue equivalence theorem State, prove, and numerically verify the Revenue Equivalence Theorem across four standard auction formats — first-price, second-price, Dutch, and English — with simulations showing when RET holds and when it breaks down.
The English Ascending Auction Implement the button auction (Japanese) model of the English ascending auction, prove that bidding up to one’s value is weakly dominant, derive expected revenue, and compare with sealed-bid formats under uniform and log-normal value distributions.
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Topic 3 · Behavioral Economics

Prospect theory, nudges, heuristics, time preferences, social norms. Topic page →

Title Description
Hyperbolic discounting and time-inconsistent strategic behaviour Model quasi-hyperbolic (beta,delta) preferences in strategic settings, find Markov perfect equilibria of intrapersonal games, and compare exponential vs hyperbolic discounters in repeated interactions.
Mental accounting and strategic framing Thaler’s mental accounting framework applied to strategic pricing: how framing purchases as bundled versus separated, or as gains versus reduced losses, systematically alters willingness to pay, modelled through transaction utility theory and simulated seller-buyer interactions.
Nudge theory and libertarian paternalism Thaler and Sunstein’s nudge framework modelled as a game between a benevolent choice architect and boundedly rational agents, with simulations of default effects on organ donation and retirement savings.
Prospect theory and reference-dependent preferences in games Incorporate Kahneman-Tversky prospect theory into game-theoretic analysis. Explore loss aversion in strategic settings, reference-dependent Nash equilibrium, how framing shifts equilibria, and endowment effects in bargaining.
Prospect theory — loss aversion and probability weighting Implement Kahneman & Tversky’s prospect theory value function and probability weighting in R, compare expected utility vs prospect theory predictions for common gambles, and visualize the S-shaped value function interactively.
The Endowment Effect and Exchange Asymmetries Model the endowment effect using loss aversion from prospect theory, simulate the Knetsch mug-pen exchange experiment, and show how loss aversion reduces trading volume below the efficient Coasian prediction.
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Topic 4 · Experimental Economics

Lab and field experiments, oTree, classical replications, meta-analysis. Topic page →

Title Description
Dictator game and pure altruism The dictator game as a test of pure altruism versus strategic motives, with warm-glow and CES utility models calibrated to Engel’s (2011) meta-analysis of experimental giving distributions.
The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism for Public Goods Implement the classic linear public goods game in R, simulating declining contributions, the restart effect, and the impact of the marginal per-capita return on free-riding behaviour, with comparison to punishment mechanisms.
The p-beauty contest: level-k thinking and iterated dominance Simulate the p-beauty contest guessing game to explore bounded rationality, level-k thinking, and the gap between Nash equilibrium predictions and experimental behaviour.
The public goods game — free-riding in the laboratory Implement the linear public goods game in R, analyse experimental data patterns including the decay of cooperation over rounds, and model how punishment mechanisms sustain contributions.
Trust game and reciprocity The Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe (1995) trust game as a test of trust and reciprocity: backward induction predicts zero investment, yet experimental evidence shows substantial trust and conditional reciprocity, modelled here with heterogeneous reciprocity preferences.
Ultimatum game experiments and fairness norms Analyse ultimatum game experimental data in R, compare observed behaviour with the subgame-perfect prediction, implement fairness utility models (Fehr-Schmidt, Bolton-Ockenfels), and visualise how culture, stakes, and framing affect offers and rejection thresholds.
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Topic 5 · Cryptography & Game Theory

Blockchain incentives, MEV, DeFi games, cryptographic protocols as games. Topic page →

Title Description
Blockchain consensus as a game Model Proof-of-Work mining as a strategic game among heterogeneous miners, analyse Nash equilibrium hash rate allocation, simulate 51% attack incentives as a coordination game, and explore mining pool formation through coalition game theory.
Commitment schemes and strategic credibility An analysis of how cryptographic commitment schemes enable credible strategic commitments in games, connecting hash-based commitment protocols to Stackelberg leadership, the value of commitment, and equilibrium refinement through binding mechanisms.
Secure Multi-Party Computation and Game-Theoretic Incentives Demonstrate finite-field secret sharing and compare ideal auction outcomes in R; the auction calculation is centralized and does not implement a secure MPC protocol.
Secure multi-party computation as a game-theoretic problem Model secure multi-party computation as a game where parties have private inputs and incentives to deviate, implement Shamir’s secret sharing in R, and visualize threshold schemes and security guarantees interactively.
Zero-knowledge proofs and strategic verification Analyse zero-knowledge proof protocols as strategic games between prover and verifier. Model completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge as equilibrium properties and explore interactive proofs for graph colouring.
Zero-knowledge proofs — game-theoretic foundations Zero-knowledge proofs modelled as interactive games between a Prover and Verifier, with simulations of the graph colouring ZKP protocol demonstrating completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge properties.
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Topic 6 · Ethics and Game Theory

Ethical dilemmas formalised, fairness, moral uncertainty, conventions, norms. Topic page →

Title Description
Fair Division and Cake-Cutting Algorithms Implement classic fair division protocols including divide-and-choose, the Selfridge-Conway envy-free procedure for three players, and compare proportional versus envy-free allocations with heterogeneous preferences using simulation in R.
Organ donation mechanism design A game-theoretic analysis of kidney exchange as a mechanism design problem, implementing pairwise exchange algorithms inspired by Roth-Sonmez-Unver, with cycle detection in compatibility graphs, incentive analysis, and welfare comparisons of allocation rules.
The Trolley Problem Through a Game-Theoretic Lens Formalising moral dilemmas as strategic interactions — modelling utilitarian and deontological ethics as payoff specifications, implementing a moral machine framework, and revealing the strategic structure of ethical choice.
The Trolley Problem as a game under moral uncertainty Formalize the Trolley Problem and its variants as decision-theoretic games under moral uncertainty in R, comparing utilitarian, deontological, and contractualist frameworks through expected moral value calculations.
Voting paradoxes and strategic voting Explore the Condorcet paradox, Arrow’s impossibility theorem, and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem through R simulations showing how rational voters manipulate elections and why no perfect voting rule exists.
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Topic 7 · Ethics Applications

Algorithmic fairness, AI safety, bioethics, climate justice, digital ethics. Topic page →

Title Description
AI Alignment as a Principal-Agent Problem Model the AI alignment challenge as a principal-agent game with moral hazard, implementing optimal contract design under limited liability and participation constraints, and analysing how increasing agent capability affects the principal’s ability to maintain alignment in R.
Algorithmic Fairness as a Multi-Stakeholder Game Modelling the tension between accuracy, fairness, and regulation as a strategic interaction — implementing fairness criteria, demonstrating impossibility results, and computing Pareto frontiers of accuracy vs fairness.
Algorithmic fairness as a multi-stakeholder game Model algorithmic fairness as a strategic game between platform, users, and regulators. Analyse equilibrium bias levels, fairness-accuracy trade-offs, and Pareto frontiers of fairness metrics using game-theoretic tools.
Algorithmic fairness through the lens of game theory Model fairness constraints in algorithmic decision-making as game-theoretic mechanisms. Compare group fairness, individual fairness, and minimax fairness using R implementations and visualise the trade-offs between accuracy and equity across demographic groups.
Privacy as a game — strategic information disclosure Model privacy decisions as games between users and data collectors, analyse the privacy paradox, simulate equilibrium disclosure under different regulation regimes, and explore mechanism design for truthful privacy-preference elicitation.
Surveillance and privacy as a strategic equilibrium A game-theoretic analysis of the surveillance-privacy tension modeled as an inspection game between a monitoring authority and citizens, with equilibrium computation, welfare analysis, and interactive visualizations of deterrence thresholds.
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Topic 8 · Case Studies

Cold War, OPEC, climate, market design, sports, poker — theory meets reality. Topic page →

Title Description
Climate coalition formation — cooperative game theory and the stability of international agreements Model international climate agreements as a cooperative partition function game, compute Shapley values for responsibility allocation, analyse coalition stability and free-riding incentives, and visualize why the grand coalition is unstable.
OPEC as a cartel — oligopoly theory applied to oil markets Model OPEC as a repeated Cournot oligopoly with heterogeneous producers, compute Nash and cartel equilibria, analyse deviation incentives, and determine the critical discount factor for cartel sustainability.
Spectrum Auction Design: A Case Study in Applied Mechanism Design Simulate key challenges in spectrum auction design — combinatorial valuations, budget constraints, and market concentration — and compare simultaneous ascending auctions with combinatorial clock auctions.
Spectrum auction design — from theory to billions in revenue Analyse the FCC spectrum auctions as a mechanism design case study, model simultaneous ascending auctions and combinatorial bidding in R, and visualize revenue outcomes across major US spectrum sales.
Tragedy of the commons — game-theoretic analysis Hardin’s tragedy of the commons modelled as an N-player commons dilemma with continuous extraction, comparing Nash equilibrium over-extraction to the social optimum and simulating Ostrom’s institutional design principles.
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