Course 2
COURSE 2 · MECHANISMS, BEHAVIOUR & ETHICS
Contents
Every tutorial in the course, topic by topic. Within a topic the tutorials are listed alphabetically.
← Back to Course 2 — Mechanisms, Behaviour & Ethics
Topic 1 · Mechanism Design
VCG, auctions, matching, voting — designing the rules of the game. Topic page →
| Title | Description |
|---|---|
| Combinatorial Auctions — Bidding on Bundles of Items | Implement the winner determination problem for combinatorial auctions using integer programming with lpSolve, model a spectrum auction with complementarities, compare VCG and first-price payment rules, and demonstrate the exposure problem in R. |
| Deferred acceptance — stable matching via the Gale-Shapley algorithm | Implement the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm for stable matching in R, prove proposer-optimality and strategy-proofness, simulate matching quality across problem sizes, and visualize the lattice of stable matchings. |
| Introduction to mechanism design — engineering incentives in strategic environments | Survey the foundations of mechanism design as ‘reverse game theory,’ covering the revelation principle, Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility, and implementation theory, with a worked R implementation of the pivotal mechanism for public goods provision. |
| Practical Matching Market Design: From NRMP to School Choice | Implement the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching, simulate the National Resident Matching Program, and compare with Top Trading Cycles for school choice. |
| The VCG mechanism — optimal multi-item allocation with truthful bidding | Implement the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism for combinatorial allocation in R, prove dominant-strategy incentive compatibility and allocative efficiency, compute Clarke pivot payments, and compare to sequential auctions. |
| The Vickrey (second-price) auction — truth-telling as a dominant strategy | Analyse the Vickrey sealed-bid second-price auction in R, prove that truthful bidding is a weakly dominant strategy, simulate revenue comparisons with first-price auctions, and visualize bidding equilibria. |
Topic 2 · Auction Theory
Revenue equivalence, Myerson optimal, combinatorial, GSP, empirical methods. Topic page →
| Title | Description |
|---|---|
| All-pay auctions and the economics of lobbying | Analyse the all-pay auction in R where all bidders pay their bids regardless of winning, derive the symmetric equilibrium with uniform values, and apply the model to lobbying, rent-seeking, and political campaigns. |
| Common-value auctions and the winner’s curse | Derive, simulate, and visualize the winner’s curse in common-value auctions: why naive bidding leads to systematic overpayment, and how rational bidders correct for the informational content of winning. |
| First-price sealed-bid auction — equilibrium bidding strategies | Derive the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the first-price sealed-bid auction in R, show bid-shading as a function of the number of bidders, and compare revenue across auction formats. |
| GSP auction for online advertising | Analyze the Generalized Second-Price auction used by search engines: compute VCG payments vs GSP equilibrium payments, show that GSP is not truthful, and characterize locally envy-free equilibria. |
| Revenue equivalence theorem | State, prove, and numerically verify the Revenue Equivalence Theorem across four standard auction formats — first-price, second-price, Dutch, and English — with simulations showing when RET holds and when it breaks down. |
| The English Ascending Auction | Implement the button auction (Japanese) model of the English ascending auction, prove that bidding up to one’s value is weakly dominant, derive expected revenue, and compare with sealed-bid formats under uniform and log-normal value distributions. |
Topic 3 · Behavioral Economics
Prospect theory, nudges, heuristics, time preferences, social norms. Topic page →
| Title | Description |
|---|---|
| Hyperbolic discounting and time-inconsistent strategic behaviour | Model quasi-hyperbolic (beta,delta) preferences in strategic settings, find Markov perfect equilibria of intrapersonal games, and compare exponential vs hyperbolic discounters in repeated interactions. |
| Mental accounting and strategic framing | Thaler’s mental accounting framework applied to strategic pricing: how framing purchases as bundled versus separated, or as gains versus reduced losses, systematically alters willingness to pay, modelled through transaction utility theory and simulated seller-buyer interactions. |
| Nudge theory and libertarian paternalism | Thaler and Sunstein’s nudge framework modelled as a game between a benevolent choice architect and boundedly rational agents, with simulations of default effects on organ donation and retirement savings. |
| Prospect theory and reference-dependent preferences in games | Incorporate Kahneman-Tversky prospect theory into game-theoretic analysis. Explore loss aversion in strategic settings, reference-dependent Nash equilibrium, how framing shifts equilibria, and endowment effects in bargaining. |
| Prospect theory — loss aversion and probability weighting | Implement Kahneman & Tversky’s prospect theory value function and probability weighting in R, compare expected utility vs prospect theory predictions for common gambles, and visualize the S-shaped value function interactively. |
| The Endowment Effect and Exchange Asymmetries | Model the endowment effect using loss aversion from prospect theory, simulate the Knetsch mug-pen exchange experiment, and show how loss aversion reduces trading volume below the efficient Coasian prediction. |
Topic 4 · Experimental Economics
Lab and field experiments, oTree, classical replications, meta-analysis. Topic page →
| Title | Description |
|---|---|
| Dictator game and pure altruism | The dictator game as a test of pure altruism versus strategic motives, with warm-glow and CES utility models calibrated to Engel’s (2011) meta-analysis of experimental giving distributions. |
| The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism for Public Goods | Implement the classic linear public goods game in R, simulating declining contributions, the restart effect, and the impact of the marginal per-capita return on free-riding behaviour, with comparison to punishment mechanisms. |
| The p-beauty contest: level-k thinking and iterated dominance | Simulate the p-beauty contest guessing game to explore bounded rationality, level-k thinking, and the gap between Nash equilibrium predictions and experimental behaviour. |
| The public goods game — free-riding in the laboratory | Implement the linear public goods game in R, analyse experimental data patterns including the decay of cooperation over rounds, and model how punishment mechanisms sustain contributions. |
| Trust game and reciprocity | The Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe (1995) trust game as a test of trust and reciprocity: backward induction predicts zero investment, yet experimental evidence shows substantial trust and conditional reciprocity, modelled here with heterogeneous reciprocity preferences. |
| Ultimatum game experiments and fairness norms | Analyse ultimatum game experimental data in R, compare observed behaviour with the subgame-perfect prediction, implement fairness utility models (Fehr-Schmidt, Bolton-Ockenfels), and visualise how culture, stakes, and framing affect offers and rejection thresholds. |
Topic 5 · Cryptography & Game Theory
Blockchain incentives, MEV, DeFi games, cryptographic protocols as games. Topic page →
| Title | Description |
|---|---|
| Blockchain consensus as a game | Model Proof-of-Work mining as a strategic game among heterogeneous miners, analyse Nash equilibrium hash rate allocation, simulate 51% attack incentives as a coordination game, and explore mining pool formation through coalition game theory. |
| Commitment schemes and strategic credibility | An analysis of how cryptographic commitment schemes enable credible strategic commitments in games, connecting hash-based commitment protocols to Stackelberg leadership, the value of commitment, and equilibrium refinement through binding mechanisms. |
| Secure Multi-Party Computation and Game-Theoretic Incentives | Demonstrate finite-field secret sharing and compare ideal auction outcomes in R; the auction calculation is centralized and does not implement a secure MPC protocol. |
| Secure multi-party computation as a game-theoretic problem | Model secure multi-party computation as a game where parties have private inputs and incentives to deviate, implement Shamir’s secret sharing in R, and visualize threshold schemes and security guarantees interactively. |
| Zero-knowledge proofs and strategic verification | Analyse zero-knowledge proof protocols as strategic games between prover and verifier. Model completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge as equilibrium properties and explore interactive proofs for graph colouring. |
| Zero-knowledge proofs — game-theoretic foundations | Zero-knowledge proofs modelled as interactive games between a Prover and Verifier, with simulations of the graph colouring ZKP protocol demonstrating completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge properties. |
Topic 6 · Ethics and Game Theory
Ethical dilemmas formalised, fairness, moral uncertainty, conventions, norms. Topic page →
| Title | Description |
|---|---|
| Fair Division and Cake-Cutting Algorithms | Implement classic fair division protocols including divide-and-choose, the Selfridge-Conway envy-free procedure for three players, and compare proportional versus envy-free allocations with heterogeneous preferences using simulation in R. |
| Organ donation mechanism design | A game-theoretic analysis of kidney exchange as a mechanism design problem, implementing pairwise exchange algorithms inspired by Roth-Sonmez-Unver, with cycle detection in compatibility graphs, incentive analysis, and welfare comparisons of allocation rules. |
| The Trolley Problem Through a Game-Theoretic Lens | Formalising moral dilemmas as strategic interactions — modelling utilitarian and deontological ethics as payoff specifications, implementing a moral machine framework, and revealing the strategic structure of ethical choice. |
| The Trolley Problem as a game under moral uncertainty | Formalize the Trolley Problem and its variants as decision-theoretic games under moral uncertainty in R, comparing utilitarian, deontological, and contractualist frameworks through expected moral value calculations. |
| Voting paradoxes and strategic voting | Explore the Condorcet paradox, Arrow’s impossibility theorem, and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem through R simulations showing how rational voters manipulate elections and why no perfect voting rule exists. |
Topic 7 · Ethics Applications
Algorithmic fairness, AI safety, bioethics, climate justice, digital ethics. Topic page →
| Title | Description |
|---|---|
| AI Alignment as a Principal-Agent Problem | Model the AI alignment challenge as a principal-agent game with moral hazard, implementing optimal contract design under limited liability and participation constraints, and analysing how increasing agent capability affects the principal’s ability to maintain alignment in R. |
| Algorithmic Fairness as a Multi-Stakeholder Game | Modelling the tension between accuracy, fairness, and regulation as a strategic interaction — implementing fairness criteria, demonstrating impossibility results, and computing Pareto frontiers of accuracy vs fairness. |
| Algorithmic fairness as a multi-stakeholder game | Model algorithmic fairness as a strategic game between platform, users, and regulators. Analyse equilibrium bias levels, fairness-accuracy trade-offs, and Pareto frontiers of fairness metrics using game-theoretic tools. |
| Algorithmic fairness through the lens of game theory | Model fairness constraints in algorithmic decision-making as game-theoretic mechanisms. Compare group fairness, individual fairness, and minimax fairness using R implementations and visualise the trade-offs between accuracy and equity across demographic groups. |
| Privacy as a game — strategic information disclosure | Model privacy decisions as games between users and data collectors, analyse the privacy paradox, simulate equilibrium disclosure under different regulation regimes, and explore mechanism design for truthful privacy-preference elicitation. |
| Surveillance and privacy as a strategic equilibrium | A game-theoretic analysis of the surveillance-privacy tension modeled as an inspection game between a monitoring authority and citizens, with equilibrium computation, welfare analysis, and interactive visualizations of deterrence thresholds. |
Topic 8 · Case Studies
Cold War, OPEC, climate, market design, sports, poker — theory meets reality. Topic page →
| Title | Description |
|---|---|
| Climate coalition formation — cooperative game theory and the stability of international agreements | Model international climate agreements as a cooperative partition function game, compute Shapley values for responsibility allocation, analyse coalition stability and free-riding incentives, and visualize why the grand coalition is unstable. |
| OPEC as a cartel — oligopoly theory applied to oil markets | Model OPEC as a repeated Cournot oligopoly with heterogeneous producers, compute Nash and cartel equilibria, analyse deviation incentives, and determine the critical discount factor for cartel sustainability. |
| Spectrum Auction Design: A Case Study in Applied Mechanism Design | Simulate key challenges in spectrum auction design — combinatorial valuations, budget constraints, and market concentration — and compare simultaneous ascending auctions with combinatorial clock auctions. |
| Spectrum auction design — from theory to billions in revenue | Analyse the FCC spectrum auctions as a mechanism design case study, model simultaneous ascending auctions and combinatorial bidding in R, and visualize revenue outcomes across major US spectrum sales. |
| Tragedy of the commons — game-theoretic analysis | Hardin’s tragedy of the commons modelled as an N-player commons dilemma with continuous extraction, comparing Nash equilibrium over-extraction to the social optimum and simulating Ostrom’s institutional design principles. |