Notation
R. Heller · Date: 2026-05-11 · Last changed: 2026-05-11
| Symbol | Meaning |
|---|---|
| \(N\) | Set of players, \(N = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}\) |
| \(A_i\) | Action set of player \(i\) |
| \(A = \prod_i A_i\) | Joint action space |
| \(a_{-i}\) | Action profile of all players except \(i\) |
| \(u_i : A \to \mathbb{R}\) | Payoff (utility) function of player \(i\) |
| \(\sigma_i \in \Delta(A_i)\) | Mixed strategy of player \(i\) |
| $^* $ | Nash equilibrium profile |
| \(v(S)\) | Characteristic function of coalition \(S\) in cooperative games |
| \(\phi_i(v)\) | Shapley value of player \(i\) |
| \(\pi\) | Policy in reinforcement learning |
| \(Q(s,a)\) | Action–value function |
| \(\gamma\) | Discount factor |
| \(\mathbb{E}[\cdot]\) | Expectation |
Common abbreviations
| Abbrev. | Expansion |
|---|---|
| BR | Best response |
| BNE | Bayesian Nash equilibrium |
| CFR | Counterfactual regret minimisation |
| ESS | Evolutionarily stable strategy |
| MARL | Multi-agent reinforcement learning |
| MDP | Markov decision process |
| MSNE | Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium |
| NE | Nash equilibrium |
| PD | Prisoner’s dilemma |
| RL | Reinforcement learning |
| SPE | Subgame-perfect equilibrium |
| TU / NTU | Transferable / non-transferable utility |
| VCG | Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism |